On April 22, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) held a public hearing to discuss the findings and recommendations related to the August 2016 accident in Silver Spring, Md. As a result of a failure on an inside service regulator, a 14-unit apartment building collapsed due to a natural gas-fueled explosion and fire. Seven residents died; 65 residents were transported to the hospital; and, three firefighters were injured.
The NTSB identified the following safety issues that contributed to the accident:
• the location and inspection of service regulators within a structure
• the inspection of the gas meter assembly
• the notification of the natural gas odor to Washington Gas
• the detection of natural gas through odorants and methane
There were 13 Safety Recommendations issued:
• Two to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
• Two to the state regulators in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia
• One to the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch
• One to the International Code Council (ICC)
• One to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
• One to the Gas Technology Institute (GTI)
• Five to Washington Gas Light
A few of the recommendations to highlight include:
To PHMSA:
• Require that all new service regulators be installed outside occupied structures
• Require existing interior service regulators be relocated outside occupied structures whenever the gas service line, meter, or regulator is replaced. In addition, multifamily structures should be priorities over single-family dwellings
To the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch:
• Revise Protocol-60 Gas Leak/Gas Odor (Natural and Liquified Petroleum Gases) to direct dispatchers to notify the gas company when any odor is called.
To ICC, NFPA & GTI:
• Coordinate to create provisions in the IFGC and NFPA codes to require methane detection systems for all types of residential occupancies with gas service. At a minimum, the provisions should cover the installation maintenance, placement of the detectors and testing requirements.
To Washington Gas:
• Implement an audit program to verify the data on the service forms used to determine the location and condition of mercury service regulators to ensure the accuracy of this safety-critical data.
• Revise your procedures and field forms to require technicians to verify the integrity of vent lines following the testing of indoor service regulators throughout your network.
• Establish a time frame with specific dates and milestones for the replacement of mercury service regulators throughout your network.
The recommendations issued by the NTSB to PHMSA and Washington Gas Light seem both reasonable and practical to implement broadly. Regardless of whether these recommendations end up in congressional mandates through Pipeline Safety Reauthorization or in federal pipeline safety regulations, APGA members should evaluate the recommendations and consider adopting them as best practices. Additionally, APGA members should use this accident as an opportunity to hold conversations with local first responders and emergency dispatchers to ensure that natural gas related calls are shared with the natural gas system.
For questions on this article, please contact Erin Kurilla of APGA staff by phone at 202-464-2742 or by email at
ekurilla@apga.org.